Commentary : global demographic change : dimensions and economic significance by Joel Mokyr
The connection between demographic and economic change, on
which Bloom and Canning have done so much important work, has
been at the center of work in economic history for many decades now.
Population change used to be at the very center of economic thought:
In the first half of the 19th century, Malthus’ ideas dominated much
of the thought of the macroeconomics of classical political economy,
and every professor teaching the Industrial Revolution gloats in
recounting how the famous “An Essay on the Principle of Population”
was obsolete almost from the day it was published.
Most economic historians still believe that in the historical past
prior to 1750 or so, population change has played a central role in
determining the fate of the economy and that the Industrial Revolu-
tion was the watershed in which this nexus was weakened. Economic
and demographic historians have carried out a huge amount of
research reconstructing population history, casting new light on dark
statistical ages (Wrigley and Schofield 1981, 1997). We know a lot
about the demographic past of European populations, though as we
go further back in time the dates become steadily more unreliable
until they all but vanish altogether and matters become inevitably
vague. Let me sum up the points of consensus and then say a few
things about what it is we simply do not know yet. I will mostly
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57confine myself to the history of Europe after 1750. I will first list a
few consensus facts, then some remaining puzzles and debates, and
finally propose a very brief outline how to think of it.
Facts
1.   Before 1750, Europe was, by and large, in a “high-pressure” equi-
librium in which both birth and death rates were quite high, but
population growth was slow, uneven, and often reversed (Livi
Bacci 2000).
2. The only effective measure of population control, prevalent in
much of Europe, was delayed marriage [infanticide was not
compatible with Judeo-Christian religion, though neglect often
approximated it] (Hajnal 1953, 1965). Women in early modern
Britain often waited until age 23-24 to get married, lopping off
an effective full one-third of their reproductive life span.
3. By 1750, population started to increase all over the European
continent, a process that continued until the 20th century, when
it grinds to a halt. The rise and subsequent decline of population
growth is known as the demographic transition (Chesnais 1992),
as illustrated in Figure 1.
4. In the intervening years, Europe’s population increased approxi-
mately from 140 million to around 800 million, despite the rapid
emigration of the period between 1840 and 1910 (McEvedy and
Jones 1978).
5. The increase was in part due to falling mortality and in part to
increasing fertility, though the relative size of these components
differs considerably from country to country, from period to
period, and between rural and urban areas (Coale and Watkins,
eds., 1986; Chesnais,1992), as demonstrated in Table 1.
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England Germany France Sweden Netherlands
and Wales
Crude Infant Crude Infant Crude Infant Crude Infant Crude Infant
death rate mortality death rate mortality death rate mortality death rate mortality death rate mortality
1881-85 19.40 139 25.76 229 22.20 167 17.5 116 21.4 181
1886-90 18.88 145 24.44 224 21.98 165 16.4 105 20.5 175
1891-95 18.74 151 23.26 224 22.32 170 16.6 103 19.6 165
1896-00 17.68 156 21.26 217 20.64 158 16.1 101 17.2 151
1901-05 16.06 138 19.90 199 19.58 141 15.5 91 16.0 136
1906-10 14.70 117 17.54 174 19.18 128 14.3 78 14.3 114
1911-13 13.90 111 15.97 163 18.27 126 13.9 71 13.0 105
Figure 1
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Table 1
Crude Death and Infant Mortality Rates, 
Selected European Countries, 1881-19136. Until the mid-20th century, the decline in mortality has been
largely due to the decline in infectious diseases, and most of the
life expectancy gains were due to a decline in infant and child
mortality (McKeown 1976, 1988).
7.   Much of the decline in mortality was slowed down by urbaniza-
tion: Because urban death rates were for many decades much
higher than rural ones, mortality rates were stagnant even though
both urban and rural rates were falling (Woods and Woodward,
eds., 1986).
8.   Fertility followed a more complex path, with appreciable increases
in the period 1750-1850 in some economies but not everywhere.
After 1850, a decline sets in, which eventually covers all countries
but which happens much earlier in some places than others
(Coale and Watkins 1986).
9.   The decline in fertility is in part due to better fertility control but
mostly due to a decline in desired family size. 
Where things are still quite controversial is in understanding why
all this happened. Here are some of the more poorly understood
issues:
Puzzles
1.   What, if any, was the connection between the Industrial Revolu-
tion and demographic change? Focusing too much on the British
case could be misleading here: The rise in fertility, because of
increased propensity to marry, observed by Wrigley and
Schofield, was attributable to the expansion of employment
opportunities in domestic industries and later factories. There is
some reason to believe that this phenomenon was specifically
British, though fertility may have also increased in Ireland and
Germany in the second half of the 18th century.
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early stages of the Industrial Revolution? Between 1760 and
1840, demographic change is likely to have retarded the onset of
modern economic growth because of Bloom-Canning type of
effects—that is to say, a temporary increase in the proportion of
children under age 15 as fertility rates increased and infant
mortality rates declined. Wrigley and Schofield (1981) document
a rise in dependency ratio until about 1825. This, too, may be
specific to Britain.
3.   How did changes in mortality and fertility affect growth rates in
the long run? This question is hard to answer, since Bloom-
Canning effects work in part through labor participation effects.
The picture is contaminated by changes in participation rates
(decline in child labor and married women participation rates), a
decline in frictional and seasonal unemployment rates due to
improved transportation and communications technology, and
emigration of people in “prime ages.”
4. A more obvious connection between demographic change and
economic growth, and one not stressed by Bloom and Canning,
was through physical health and decline in morbidity. Diseases
come in different kinds, and the net economic effect of any
decline in morbidity depends both on the age of the patients and
on the types of diseases that are being eliminated. In the 19th
century, some of the diseases on the retreat were mostly danger-
ous to babies (smallpox, food poisoning), whereas tuberculosis,
for instance, killed young adults. Some diseases had higher meas-
urable social costs if they debilitated but did not kill (such as
parasitic disease or polio). Other diseases either killed patients
very quickly or they made a  full recovery. A third kind of diseases
weakened immune systems and thus made people more suscepti-
ble to other diseases. The social costs of medical progress thus
differed a great deal by disease. The net effects of the decline in
each disease are still not fully understood. What is therefore
needed is a general disease-specific analysis of mortality decline.
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warmer parts of East and South Asia, Europe suffered relatively
less from parasitic and debilitating diseases, making morbidity
less costly. For an interesting example of the impact of hookworm
on the U.S. South, see Brinkley (1997).
5.   After 1860, there are signs that improved nutrition and housing,
as well as breakthroughs in certain kinds of medicine, start to
improve immunity and reduce the impact of certain diseases.
There are subtle signs that people grow healthier late in the 19th
century: Most of them are from estimates of height (Steckel 1995;
Floud and Steckel, eds., 1997). Taller people are, in and of them-
selves, not more productive of course, but height is correlated
with health. Healthier and better-fed children grow taller and can
absorb human capital more efficiently. Healthier adults are more
productive. This kind of change shows up in the “residual” of
standard measures of total factor productivity (TFP), and it is
precisely the kind of effect that Bloom and Canning have in
mind. During the industrialization process, urbanization clearly
increased mortality, but this was increasingly attenuated by rising
real incomes and improved nutrition after 1850, though not
before. Perhaps the sharpest decline in mortality, especially in
infant mortality, occurs in the first two decades of the 20th
century. This has never been fully explained, but one prime
candidate is that urban mortality rates finally came down as a
result of urban public health campaigns and the so-called “urban
penalty” was eliminated.
6.   How do we distinguish between McKeown effects, which attrib-
ute the decline in mortality to rising incomes that led to
improved nutrition and housing, as opposed to public-health
effects that attribute the decline in death rates primarily to public
health campaigns? The literature on this issue is complex and
cannot be done justice to here. At an early stage, empirical work
by Preston (1976) indicated only weak support for the income-
62 Joel Mokyrled health hypothesis, and subsequent work by Szreter (1988) has
further weakened it, but see Fogel (2004).
7. The decline in 20th century European fertility seems the most
puzzling of all demographic phenomena. A naive Darwinian
approach would perhaps underline the surprise. After all, in the
19th century, the population of the Western world had become
the most successful species in the history of the planet in terms of
its ability to control its external environment, command
resources, and increase its living standards. Yet, despite the fact
that if sociobiology means anything, it must mean that Darwin-
ian selection over thousands of generations presumably should
have selected people by their “preference for offspring,” meaning
that as living standards rose, people should have enjoyed vast
families—this is not what happened. Instead, it seems as if the
Western world is well on its way to commit demographic suicide.
There are, of course, some good explanations for this, but which
of the many suggested holds true is still up in the air.
8. What is also poorly understood is the internal variation within
Europe. Basically, the stylized facts are these: In terms of
economic development and technological leadership, Britain was
the undisputed leader. But in terms of demographic change, it
was somewhere in the middle. In terms of mortality, as far as we
can tell, England and Wales were behind the Scandinavian coun-
tries, Germany was behind France, and Belgium was behind the
Netherlands. Obviously, industrialization and income were not
the only explanation of mortality (Chesnais 1992, pp. 77, 145).
The same is true for fertility decline: France, as is well-known, led
the world in fertility decline, followed closely by Sweden,
Belgium, and Switzerland (Chesnais 1992, pp. 104-105, 146).
What we can say, therefore, is that while all European countries
made the transition from the high-pressure to the low-pressure
regime after 1750, they followed quite different trajectories.
Some of them, like Ireland and Russia, were highly unusual for
different reasons. Yet, oddly enough, after 1945 we observe a
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the various European countries slowly evaporated—so that by
now most of the variations in crude birth and death rates, as well
as infant mortality rates, have become very small (excepting many
of the succession states of the former Soviet Union).
Toward an explanation of long-term demographic behavior
How are we to think of this? Demographic behavior is hugely
complex—some of it rather simple at the level of incomes and costs,
and much of it at levels of analysis that economists rarely deal with.
Social historians used to refer to “modernization” before the term
became unfashionable. Yet, some aspects of it are clearly central to the
story here. I will just mention two: secularization and gender history.
The role of religion in daily life in Europe declined sharply after
1800, whether we look at Catholic, Protestant, or Orthodox coun-
tries. With secularization came two related phenomena that affected
demographic behavior: One was a less fatalistic approach to disease
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Birth rate,  Birth rate,  Death rate,  Death rate, 
1900 2000 1900 2000
Great Britain 28.7 10.6 18.2 10.4
Germany 35.6 8.2 22.1 10.6
France 21.3 12.3 21.9 9.3
Italy 33.0 8.6 23.8 10.9
Ireland 22.7 15.3 19.6 8.3
Netherlands 31.6 10.6 17.9 8.9
Belgium 28.9 9.7 19.3 10.0
Sweden 27.0 8.2 16.8 10.6
Hungary 39.4 8.8 27.0 13.5
Switzerland 28.6 8.6 19.3 9.8
Russia 49.3 8.6 31.1 14.6
Romania 38.8 10.4 24.2 12.5
Coefficient 0.24  0.20 0.18 0.16
of variation
Table 2
The Demographic Convergenceand death, which prompted people to take a more activist approach
toward the prevention and treatment of disease. The other was a
greater willingness to control fertility. 
Furthermore, modernization, whatever it is, also affected the divi-
sion of labor between men and women in Western society. As far as
gender roles are concerned, the identification problem is simply
horrendous: Did women have fewer babies because their economic
role in society changed or did their economic function change
because of lower desired family size? To confuse things further, the
development here was far from linear and monotonic: Between 1800
and maybe 1920 or 1930, women’s role in society changed toward
greater specialization in home-making; only after 1945 do we see a
slow increase in married women in the labor force. The decline in
fertility preceded this emancipation.
To propose a theory explaining all of this in a few pages would be
pretentious indeed. Yet, let me make an argument taken from my
earlier work on the role of knowledge in the economic transformation
of society (Mokyr 2002). The argument is microeconomic in nature
and thus complements the fundamentally macroeconomic approach
of Bloom and Canning. The model is an explanation of the decline
of mortality, but it can easily be adapted to matters of fertility control.
Look at the standard model of consumer behavior. Each consumer
chooses a set of goods he or she buys or obtains at some cost. These
goods are chosen because they are in some way pleasure-enhancing,
or because the consumer thinks that they are health-enhancing or
both. This can be written simply as
U = U(X1,X2, ... Xn, H).  (1)
and
H = H(X1,X2, ... Xm), (2)
where m < n goods affect Health. Note that the X’s stand for both
market-purchased and home-produced goods and services.
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problem is that equation 2 is never directly observed and hugely
complex, containing complex relations between microbes, the immune
system, and climate. Two extreme cases: (a) complete information, that
is, the consumer behaves as if he or she fully knows equation 2. This
implies a bundle of X’s that maximize utility including health, say X*,
(b) primitive consumption: The consumer ignores equation 2 alto-
gether. This implies a very different bundle of X’s, say X’.
Consumers normally find themselves at an allocation somewhere in
between the two. But within that continuum there is a great deal of
room for improvement, as consumers become better informed and
change consumption habits to accommodate the new knowledge.
The point I wish to emphasize is that private health improvements
may have been as important as the much touted “public health”
improvements. When the consumer learns more about his or her
health being affected by consumption, he or she can often redeploy
resources in a fairly minor way and attain considerable improvements
in health without major additional expenses. This explains the decline
in mortality rates from infectious and deficiency diseases long before
cures were available: Prevention was easier than cure. As can readily
be seen, a rise in income would have a comparable effect, since at
higher income a consumer would consume more goods he and she
likes, and hopefully the effect of the increase in the consumption of
health-enhancing goods dominates that of health-reducing goods.
But an increase in the consumer’s knowledge of equation 2 can
improve health even when income stays the same. Thus, rising
income and improving knowledge reinforced one another. To
complete the argument, moreover, we can regard changes in public
policy as income-preserving changes in relative prices, in which
health-enhancing goods such as clean water or insect control are now
supplied at a much lower price due to the government taking a more
active role. There are, thus, three effects: a McKeown effect (pure
income rise), a public policy effect (relative prices), and a knowledge
effect (in which health improves even in the absence of the other two
simply because equation 2 is now somewhat better understood. These
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health-enhancing and health is a rising function of A. We start off
from E1. A pure income effect would take the economy to E2 whereas
a pure relative price (public policy) effect would take us to E3. A
fourth possibility is for the economy to move to E4 on account of
better knowledge of equation 2. In reality, of course, the three effects
occurred side by side, but analytically they are quite distinct.
Between 1870 and 1920, the main developments in this field were
the discovery of the germ theory of disease, the discovery that
consuming trace elements of certain substances could prevent
diseases, and the growing use of experimental methods and statistics
in medical science to establish patterns and regularities that would
help epidemiologists understand modes of infection. This led, for
example, to the discovery that insects were vectors of certain diseases
but not others, how fresh cow milk could pass on bovine tuberculo-
sis, how and when water that looked clean and tasted fine might still
have to be boiled or filtered, and many similar discoveries. At times,
of course, the new knowledge turned out to be wrong and needed to
be corrected. Some diseases defied medical knowledge, and there was
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E4little consumers could do to help them avoid them (for example,
polio before the vaccine).
These advances were constrained in their diffusion to the popula-
tion at large. First, the knowledge had to be developed and scientists
had to persuade one another. Second, the knowledge had to be
disseminated to the population at large through education and infor-
mation channels. Third, once people were aware of the effects, they
still had to be persuaded to change their behavior in the face of
customs, habits, suspicion of authority, addiction, lack of self-control,
and plain conservatism. Fourth, of course, the new allocation toward
more health-enhancing consumer goods had to satisfy the budget
constraints of the population. It is therefore not surprising that there
were substantial lags in this process and that it spread out over the
better part of a century, and that it caught on more in some societies
and groups than elsewhere. Yet, the fact remains that from 1890 on,
many of the main infectious diseases that killed people declined and
some disappeared altogether, despite the fact that almost none of
those diseases could be cured before the appearance of antibiotics.
Improved knowledge can also be argued to have affected fertility
behavior, though the story here is a bit more complicated. Of course,
contraception is a technology, and not necessarily a simple one.
Women and men had to learn things about their bodies, as well as
understand risks and find solutions. Bloom and Canning rightly
point to the Irish example as evidence of the point that sheer avail-
ability of contraceptive means may make a difference to fertility rates. 
But many scholars argue that the main reason for the decline in
fertility is a different aspect of increasing knowledge: Modern tech-
nology meant a rise in the rate of return to human capital, and that
the substitution effect here offset the income effect, so that parents
preferred to have smaller families with high-quality, well-educated
children. This argument is now almost a canon of the economic
growth literature. And yet, in my view, the argument is not very
persuasive without a great deal more details and elaboration. For
68 Joel Mokyrinstance, the budget constraint of time has changed in the past 50
years: Men, at least, have far more leisure than they used to have.
Why is it that they spend it watching sports rather than raising chil-
dren? Moreover, much of the investment in human capital of children
that is supposedly so time intensive as to swamp the income effect is
outsourced to specialists, from kindergartens to summer camps to
universities. 
What this simple model is pointing to is something deeper than
just another explanation of falling mortality rates. It points to the
central factor in economic modernization, which led to the demo-
graphic transition. The real question is not so much whether income
affected health or health affected income. Instead, I suggest that the
main engine of both demographic and economic change was neither
income nor fertility or mortality but an improved ability and willing-
ness to control the external environment in which we live. This
required modern science, but it also requires the mechanisms by
which the insights of modern science diffuse to the population at
large, requiring not just “education” but a certain status of authority
and power of the people who control this knowledge, so that they can
do more than just inform and enlighten people, but actually make
them change their behavior and consumption patterns. That, as we
all know, is a much tougher task.
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